THE New Republic

The Hollywood Tragedy—*a la* Chayefsky

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Politics in California-I

By RONNIE DUGGER

A Reply to My Critics . . . . . *Denis Healey*
Thoughts on Camus . . . . . *Gerald W. Johnson*
Conscience of the Rich . . . . . *Charles Curran*
Juan Gris . . . . . *Frank Getlein*

A Professor of Philosophy Writes:

"It is the Big Question and the Big Answer which are again exciting larger numbers of able students. But not the Big Answer of . . . any traditional Christian Sect." —*A Communication from Asher Moore*

JUNE 2, 1958

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Washington Wire

"Talk, talk, talk"

"NEARLY EIGHT MONTHS after the abrupt dawn of the space age," wrote *New York Times* man John Finney in a front-page news story last Sunday, "the US still has no firm program, organization or funds for the race into space with the Soviet Union." All we have had since last October, he quotes a government official as saying, is "talk, talk, talk."

Eight months passed and nothing done. That's the story. Eisenhower poohpoohed the Soviet achievement last fall; it did not worry him "one iota." Now he uses "Sputnik" as a synonym for unnecessary anxiety and alarm: he urged the nation recently not to adopt a "Sputnik" attitude toward the current business recession. (Oddly enough, last November he said we had "solved" the nose cone re-entry problem; the Administration "solved" the problem all over again last week, with new whoops of rejoicing.)

To boil it all down—Moscow has a satellite 100 times heavier than ours, and the engine to launch it; we are two to five years behind in this lethal race; after eight months the Administration still has no program. . . . It is not merely that Eisenhower lacks the physical energy, he appears to lack the interest to meet this crucial challenge.

(Eisenhower popularity stood at 79 percent on the Gallup rating, January, 1957; today, 54 percent.)

Business in Government

WE SUPPOSE it is regrettable that top businessmen are loathe to work for the government, as a Harvard Business School Club survey discloses. But it doesn't make us shiver as it does columnist Roscoe Drummond. After all, why should top businessmen run our government? We feel a lot safer under professional politicians and civil servants. Harold Laski wrote in *The American Presidency* (just re-issued in paper covers by Grosset & Dunlap): "The business aristocracy of America preferred to occupy itself with the making of wealth, leaving to the political parties the definition of the terms upon which it could be made, and themselves helping to frame those terms. . . . American business is as powerful a 'lobby' in Washington as there is anywhere in the world. . . . The successful businessman . . . is usually of little value in politics because that blending of wills in the give and take of compromise is rarely a quality that distinguishes him." Holding the strings of the Invisible Government already, why should top businessmen take Washington jobs?

1953 and 1958

WE REMEMBER the House Un-American Activities Committee investigating Bishop Oxnam in 1953. J. B. Matthews, the star-spangled expert, began his 1953 *American Mercury* piece: "The largest single group supporting the Communist apparatus in the US is composed of Protestant clergy." Rep. Donald Jackson (R, Cal.)—now second in seniority on the Committee—declared the Bishop "served God on Sundays but Communist fronts the rest of the week." For watchfulness like this the Committee was made permanent and got $305,000 last January to carry on its admirable work.

Now the target is Cyrus Eaton, Cleveland industrialist and creator of a $150 million steel-rail empire. On a TV program he likened J. Edgar Hoover's FBI to Hitler's Gestapo, and said a nation isn't safe that makes secret police its heroes. This was pretty strong, of course, even though we find few things gall us more than seeing a dick like Hoover posing as Elder Statesman and mingling in politics. Hoover frankly acknowledges, for example, that his Bureau is currently operating 90 telephone wiretaps. Since this is illegal "he in effect pleaded guilty to 90 violations of Federal law," the *Washington Post* observed.

Well, anyway, Richard Arens, staff director of the Committee, went right on the air and announced that Chairman Walter had issued a subpoena for Eaton for his un-American action in indulging in free speech. Presumably the charge is *lese majeste*.

Times certainly have changed, however, since the Oxnam incident. We doubt if they ever actually served that subpoena. It sounded good on a TV program, but the Walter-Jackson-Arens committee has been getting a bad press. And of course Eaton is an awfully rich man, not some minister of the gospel or starveling professor.

Eyes on the Job

ADD "PLANNED RECESSION"—Secretary Weeks told businessmen at the Hot Springs, Va., conference recently that his advisers were, on the whole, "unworried about the economic outlook," and some of them in fact seemed to think "a recession is a good thing—it clears away the deadwood." (Labor Secretary Mitchell predicts 6 million unemployed in June).

Irving Hexter, Cleveland publisher of 15 industrial periodicals, wrote, "The most salutary thing in our city—and probably in yours—is to ride by the main office of the Ohio State Unemployment Commission and see hundreds of people waiting in a never-receding line for their unemployment checks. . . . Maybe they'll go back to work a little harder, with their eyes on their jobs rather than on their watches. . . . "

Notes

THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, which hired the public relations firm of Whitaker & Baxter to help defeat the Truman health insurance plan by calling it "socialized medicine," has hired a new Los Angeles firm, Braun & Co., to help defeat the Forand bill for Federal health insurance for old people. . . . Steel prices will jump in July; Senator Estes Kefauver already plans an investigation. . . . High beef-hog prices (resulting from the 1957 drought) will drop in July-August; living costs should stabilize at last. . . . Widespread mental image of the economy bouncing back once it touches bottom isn't accurate; lacking strong Federal counter-action full recovery isn't expected for about a year—maybe two.

T.R.B.

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A Communication

► *Religion at Harvard*

THOUGH an alumnus of Harvard, it would be pretentious for me to try to weigh, from a distance of a thousand miles, the merits of the internecine battle over the place of religion in higher education which, Mr. Bartley implies in his

(Continued on page 21)

Re-Appraisal

I—The Weakening of the West

NINE YEARS after the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance, five years after the death of Stalin, and only 18 months after the dramatic crisis of the Soviet empire, the West finds itself in a position of unprecedented political weakness. One should think that this is the most obvious fact about the present crisis of Western policy. It is certainly why there is now an international debate about the future of that policy—by public opinion if not by our responsible policy-makers. Yet most of the participants in that debate still seem curiously unwilling to admit the fact which alone explains why the re-appraisal is underway.

Among orthodox defenders of the policy hitherto pursued, this ostrich-like attitude arises from the desire to defend their record—from a refusal, that is, to recognize the share which their own *immobilisme* has had in bringing us to our present pass. Among many of the critics of prevailing policies, on the other hand, the need for self-deception about the present springs not from a tendency to glorify the past, but from dreams about a rosy future—the will to believe that a change of policy could produce miraculous results without hard and risky effort. One side insists that a policy of purely military containment, without political initiative and imagination, has been working well. The other all too frequently suggests that military effort could now be *replaced* by political initiative, because our Soviet opponents are supposed to have changed so remarkably that they no longer constitute a serious military danger.

In this and further editorials, we propose to recall some of the evidence against these dangerous illusions. We wish to show that our old Maginot policy has failed to maintain the unity and morale of the Western alliance, to retain the sympathy of the uncommitted countries, or to use constructively the opportunities offered by the succession crisis in the Communist world; that with the Soviet bloc once again consolidated under a single, uncontested leader, *no* basic change has occurred in the nature of the combined politico-military threat against which the Western alliance was formed; and that both a major change of policy and a steady, long-term military effort will be needed if we are to hold our own against that threat, let alone to turn the tables on the Soviet bloc.

The stubborn pretense that our official policy of a strictly military "containment" has been succeeding, and that time is on our side if only we have the fortitude to stick to the well-tried recipe, is not confined to Secretary Dulles and the Eisenhower Administration; it has found its most eloquent expression to date in the urbane diatribe launched by Dean Acheson against George Kennan in the April issue of *Foreign Affairs!* There, the original architect of NATO painted a moving picture of how Western Europe had consolidated its economic and political unity behind the NATO shield; how the irresistible pull of its prosperity had brought about the crisis in Russia's satellite empire, and was forcing a transformation even in Russia itself by stimulating the popular demand for higher living stand-

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ards; and how we had achieved all this by building up our defenses and avoiding risky diplomatic maneuvers. The Russians could not fail to accept our terms in the end, if only we held out long enough and did not listen to the faint-hearted who only talked of new policies because they had got tired of the steady effort needed to implement the old and successful one.

This sort of thing makes strange and sad reading today. The unity of Western Europe was to have been built around France as its center. The NATO shield, with the bulk of the French forces bogged down in Algeria, the British steadily reducing their continental garrisons and the Germans building their Bundeswehr ever so slowly, has become more and more overwhelmingly an American shield for Europe, instead of becoming less so. The crisis of the Soviet empire has passed, and we have actively helped Mr. Khrushchev to overcome it by coldly discouraging all Polish efforts at an independent diplomatic role. The pressure of the Russian people for higher living standards has not prevented their government from beating us to the Sputniks. As for the critics of Western policy, particularly in Western Europe, it is quite true that many of them reflect a mood of near-hysterical irresponsibility and moral fatigue; but why, if the policies of our and their governments are so wise, is such a mood spreading? Why, also, have so many of the uncommitted nations outside Europe become increasingly "neutral against us" in recent years? Is our answer to be Mussolini's—"the masses are asses"?

We are not suggesting that all these setbacks are due to avoidable mistakes of American policy. This nation is not all-powerful. It is doubtful whether any conceivable policy could have prevented a Communist victory in China; nor do we think that the State Department is to blame for what is happening to France or the Algerian tragedy. But when we are given the fairy tale about steady growth in Western strength since the foundation of NATO, we must object.

☆

In the first place, it will not do to compare our present position with that existing 10 years ago, before NATO was created, as if events had developed in a straight line. Of course military containment played a decisive role in stopping the Soviet advance in Europe in the early years, and military intervention was necessary to halt the Communist attack in Korea! It is also legitimate to argue that the post-Stalin change toward the tactics of "competitive coexistence" was, in part at least, the belated fruit of our steadfast resistance to the Stalinist tactics of bullying and conquest. But it is also clear that we have failed to extract from these changes any progress toward our objectives—such as a settlement for Eastern Europe that would loosen and ultimately end Soviet domination over its peoples, the growth of a more self-reliant Western Europe which would be capable of providing an increasing share of her own defenses, and generally an increase in our over-all security. The last few years have, on the contrary, brought a steady deterioration in West European morale, a new consolidation of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, and a steady weakening of our influence not only in the Middle East, but among the uncommitted nations in general.

In the second place, we must object to the idea that this turn of the tide against the Atlantic community and the US especially is due to an abandonment of Mr. Acheson's well-tried policies by Mr. Dulles. It is due to their unimaginative continuation and extension in a changed situation. Granted that Mr. Dulles, by his early rhetorical excesses, did some harm which Mr. Acheson would have avoided; yet, his talk of "massive retaliation" and the "brink of war" was only so much new icing on the old cake. Granted also that a world policy based on a system of military pacts and bases is bound to come to grief if you get behindhand in the arms race because of a domestic economy drive or over-emphasis on the deterrent values of SAC, the basic trouble was to have our policy so exclusively based on military strength.

☆

The main reason for our loss of influence in the Middle East and Asia was the attempt to extend the alliance system to areas whose peoples did not feel threatened by Russia—the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, followed by an interpretation of the Eisenhower Doctrine as something on which the Middle Eastern states had to declare "for" or "against." The main reason for our failure to keep the East European situation in flux was not loose talk about "liberation," but, as Denis Healey and others have been saying in this journal, the absence of any serious diplomatic attempt to explore possible terms for a Soviet troop withdrawal from Europe. And the main reason for the weakening of West European morale and the consequent crisis of NATO itself was not simply European fear of growing Soviet strength—after all, Russian capacity to destroy Western Europe by H-bombs has existed since 1953 or '54, and it is only our own danger that has been directly increased by missile developments—but a growing sense of futility and hopelessness in the armament effort, a growing belief that there was no light at the end of the tunnel, but only a blind drift toward nuclear war.

Fundamentally, we have been losing ground all over the world because we are regarded as obsessed with a narrow concept of military strength which precludes us from taking in political realities and exploring political solutions. In fact, this reputation has caused us to slide into a position of increasing military weakness as well, while the Soviets, more nimble in their political footwork, have also been gaining in military strength. Any sound re-appraisal of policy must start from this truth.

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De Gaulle's Return

GENERAL DE GAULLE'S greatest strength can be summed up in the ancient adage: "You can't beat somebody with nobody." There simply is no one else, or at least no one less dangerous in the view of the Left, the legalist or, for that matter, the vast number of French men and women who can be called uncommitted. Marshal Juin would be far worse than de Gaulle, and by now the armed forces—or the generals and admirals who speak for them—would find it difficult to accept a cabal or coalition of Parliamentarians, no matter how Gaullist or simply authoritarian they profess to be. The so-called apathy of the great mass of Frenchmen in France (or really Paris) is deceptive. What is going on is not a Revolution. It is a *coup d'état,* in fact or in state of becoming, and if there's anything the last 30 years should have taught us about modern politics, it is that the *coup d'état* is always made, or at least begun, by a minority. The late Curzio Malaparte described the process in his book, *The Technique of the Coup d'état,* before Hitler came to power; and since the Prague putsch in 1948 and its many variants which have followed the process has not changed much.

There are some serious questions, however. First, will the Communist Party of France act in accordance with what its leaders, principally Jacques Duclos, consider to be the best interest for the party within France, or would it obey orders from Moscow? The situation in France might dictate armed resistance, and hence open civil war, if the Communist Party is not to be wiped out in France. Moscow, however, might rule against such a course; first because of the danger of the spread of violence beyond the frontiers of France; second, because it might prefer to hope that the nationalist de Gaulle would weaken, if not dismantle altogether, NATO and the Atlantic Alliance.

But the most serious question of all is: Will de Gaulle rule alone, by himself and for himself, or will he be ruled by others, for themselves and for other purposes? If he comes to power he will not do so because the whole French people, or even a large majority of them, have turned to him because of his merits or even on the basis of his promises, or their hopes about his merits or promises. He will come to power because an elaborate plot has succeeded; because a technically skillful effort has created an apparatus which could be used as a springboard for his return. And the members of this organization are both soldiers and civilians, both honest Gaullists and men who are looking forward eagerly to the post-Gaullist period when their own less savory ambitions can conceivably be satisfied.

It is quite obvious that the members of this pro-de Gaulle organization, if it can be called an organization, now include representatives of all of the forces which since the creation of the French Republic, and before, have been bent upon the distortion of the purpose of that Republic or its downright destruction. It is not yet clear, but it will soon become clear, whether de Gaulle will lend himself to the purposes of any of these groups or actually make the effort to take control himself and get rid of support which may have been important for him in the formative period but which will mean destruction of everything he stands for if it continues after he is actually in power.

It is very probable that de Gaulle will give no indication how he will answer this key question before he comes to power. But if and when he does come to power, if he does not forthwith take the daring and dangerous step of clapping into jail probably several dozen if not several score of his most ardent civilian supporters, he will be lost, or at least that France which he offers to save will be lost.

A Conversation With

LEONARD BERNSTEIN

"The whole plot to make the opening of Beethoven's Fifth mean V for Victory makes the symphony twice as popular. . . . But that's nonsense! V has nothing to do with those first four notes—all they are is three G's and an E Flat."

NEXT WEEK

Behind the Conspiracy

JEAN DANIEL, whose dispatches from Algeria and Paris have been appearing in *The New Republic,* has written in *L'Express* an Eric Amblerish account of the intrigue which led to the present crisis in France. The key to the conspiracy, he says, is Jacques Soustelle, once a college professor and once on the political Left, who later headed the French wartime espionage and counter-espionage services, and after the war was sent to Algiers as Governor-General by Mendés-France. In 1956 Soustelle founded the Union for the Salvation and Renewal of French Algeria and enlisted the help of René Dumont, a rich manufacturer who had served in the wartime spy services. In 1958, at a general assembly of the USRAF, Soustelle was joined by many active, anti-Left (if not downright Right) politicians.

Meantime, Dumont had been mobilizing (and paying) not only former spies but members of the *Service d'Ordre* (less politely, goonsquads) of the Gaullist Rally of the French People, including more than half of its

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members who had worked for Vichy and the Germans in World War II. The USRAF joined forces with the extremists of Algeria and anyone else who was willing to work for pay and Soustelle. No questions asked about the past, but many promises about the future.

A man with a police record, named Sanguinetti, arranged to get the support of the Commandos of Africa and the Commandos of the French Union. Others in the network were comrades of the Poujadist and anti-Semitic deputy Le Pen. Important too was Antoine Mellero, former police commissioner of Morocco, accused of various political murders and at this moment in jail awaiting trial for the murder of Jacques Lemaigre Dubreuil, a rich Frenchman who dared favor Moroccan independence several years ago.

Another central figure in the conspiracy in Algiers, M. Daniel reveals, was Alain de Serigny, former collaborator and the only man in North Africa ever decorated by Pétain. De Serigny is editor of the newspaper *Echo d'Algiers,* boss of the *cólons* and professed leader of the extremists. Through an elaborate intrigue, Leon Delbecque was planted in Algeria as the representative of the French ministry of Defense, but his real mission was to win over to the plot leading military officers in Algeria. One of his first contacts was with Colonel Trinquier, aide to General Massu. Lt. Lagaillarde, parachutist president of the Algiers Student Federation, served as one of his Left tools.

Such men as these started and kept moving the false rumor that Premier Pflimlin was about to "sell out" Algeria and when, toward the end Massu, General Salan and the other top soldiers wavered, the machine in France rushed key men—Picard, Neuwihr and others—to pledge publicly that General de Gaulle was with them and to assure privately that General de Gaulle could eventually be used by them.

The Cutting Edge

THE NEW REPUBLIC is happy to announce that its Illumination Award goes this week to the Reverend Dr. William R. Barnhart, chairman of the Department of Religion and Philosophy at Hood College in Frederick, Maryland.

Dr. Barnhart wins the trophy, a handsome rubber candle, for his recent sermon at the Bethesda First Baptist Church, in which he compared the Russians to the ancient Spartans, and found them "subhumanly unfit to rule mankind." For, he declared, the Russians have developed Sputniks and guided missiles "at the expense of human values."

To elaborate this point, Dr. Barnhart drew upon his own recent trip to the Soviet Union. "I didn't see a lawnmower in Russia," he said, "and there are very few automobiles."

Double Images

THE *Los Angeles Mirror-News* of May 15, dutifully reporting all the news, reflects a double image that is becoming commonplace in the press. Under the heading: "Factory Jobs Here Show Drop in April," the State Director of Industrial Relations is quoted as announcing that layoffs in the Los Angeles-Long Beach area (mostly in motors, aircraft, machinery, rubber and apparel) brought factory employment down to its lowest level since mid-1955. Other headlines noted the Federal Reserve Board's announcement that national industrial production, after dropping for eight successive months, had reached the lowest level since October, 1954.

But under the headline: "Insurance Head Sees Recession as Beneficial," the *Mirror-News'* business writer reports on a Los Angeles press conference of Frederick W. Ecker, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company head, who asks us to believe that "setbacks are good for the long run; the country is better off with readjustments."

Air Traffic Control

"HAD ALL parties been about three years ahead of where they are now," testified Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman James R. Durfee after the recent Las Vegas airliner collision, "this accident might have been averted." Mr. Durfee did not add for the benefit of his Congressional listeners that three years ago the Administration turned down as too expensive the well-laid plans of its own specialized agencies for modernization of our air-traffic-control system (*NR,* July 16, 1956). The Administration's decision in 1955 not to order recommended radar facilities is certainly related to the subsequent death of 128 passengers in the 1956 Grand Canyon collision and the loss of 61 lives in the last month —49 near Las Vegas and 12 over Brunswick, Md.

The CAB now estimates that it would take five years before an adequate system of air traffic control covering both civil and military flying could be put in operation over a "major portion" of the country's airspace. And this, says the CAB, is a "most optimistic" forecast. Meanwhile the volume of flying will not remain fixed, waiting for control and safety techniques to catch up to where we are. There are today about 90,000 aircraft of all types in the United States; the number will rise to 125,000 by 1975. Before the end of 1958, commercial jet airliners, with their vastly greater speeds (especially at landing and take-off) will be coming into service. "Near-misses" involving aircraft in flight are reported on an average of almost four a day.

The President was playing golf when two worried Congressmen tried to see him about the Brunswick accident. We do not censure him for that, but for what came after. He did confer with concerned legislators

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the next day and announced his "emergency" program. But most of that program deals only with military jet planes on training flights—these having been involved in the Brunswick collision. Nothing the President said calls for increased expenditures for modernizing air-traffic-control equipment. It has been left to the Congress to respond more ambitiously.

Congressional anger was expressed at a House Appropriations Subcommittee hearing following the Las Vegas disaster, when Rep. Albert Thomas (D, Texas) told CAB Chairman Durfee to "just tell us what is needed. We don't ask how much it is going to cost."

After some prodding Durfee agreed that "we need more money, more men, more machines."

Under Mr. Eisenhower's emergency program, the Air Coordinating Committee, representing the military services and civilian aviation agencies, is to have a leading role in reconciling air jurisdictions. The Committee's effectiveness to date as an air traffic arbiter may be measured by a story which came out of the Las Vegas crash inquiry: The Air Force Base where the ill-fated jet trainer took off is directly beneath a heavily-traveled civilian airway, and 60 non-military flights pass over the base each day. Yet the jet trainer had no clearance from a Civil Aeronautics Administration control tower.

To perfect an adequate air-traffic-control system over the next five years would cost slightly over one billion dollars. It would also require coordinated direction by a yet-to-be-created Federal Aviation Agency. Will Congress create such an Agency? Only over the dead bodies of the Commerce Department, which does not want to surrender its control over civil aeronautics, and military officers who don't want civilians regulating their flights.

McCarthy's Nomination

IT IS GRATIFYING that Eugene McCarthy has been selected—on the second ballot and by 307 to 139 votes—as the candidate of the Democrats in Minnesota to run this November against incumbent Republican Sen. Edward J. Thye, and that despite a hard-fought campaign for the Democratic nomination between Representative McCarthy and the very able stateswoman Mrs. Eugenie Anderson the spirit of togetherness has again descended on the party. It is gratifying, too, that the liberal Representative McCarthy's Catholicism was not used to beat him down, although Catholics in Minnesota number only 25 to 30 percent of the population.

As we suggested before the Democratic nominating convention, which was held last week, Eugene McCarthy is one of the most able and inspiring of the younger Democrats on the national scene. His election to the Senate would be a credit to Minnesota, a contribution to the political maturity of the country and restore to the name McCarthy a clean, pure taste.

"You'll be glad to know I found your lost cat"

Who Needs Schools

THE 15-15 vote by which the House Education and Labor Committee has just refused to send to the floor the Federal Aid to School Construction Bill spared the Eisenhower Administration the embarrassment of a record vote on this issue in this session. The bill introduced in April by Rep. Frank Thompson, Jr. (D, N.J.) was designed specifically to cause such embarrassment. Neither Thompson nor most other House liberals thought there was a real chance of passing the four-year, $1.3 billion federal aid program this year. The President did not even ask for school construction in his 1958 program—perhaps because he feared how the Republican response would look on the record. This, in spite of the fact that there were 2.3 million children for whom there is not adequate space in our public schools this year and that half a million new classrooms are needed to hold the 6 million children who will enter school in the next five years.

Thompson managed to push his bill through the Education Subcommittee, but when it came up in the full committee, an Eisenhower Republican, Rep. Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey, had rounded up enough votes to prevent its going to the floor. Two Southern Democrats, Committee Chairman Graham Barden of North Carolina and Rep. Phil Landrum of Georgia voted with the 13 Republicans on the committee against allowing the House to stand and be counted.

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Labor Belabored

THE NATION as a whole is not aware of it, but organized labor is fighting its most desperate defensive battle since passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. Publicity has focused on one side of this fight—the Congressional tussle over national labor legislation. But while Senator Kennedy holds hearings and George Meany testifies on Capitol Hill, another battle is raging across a seven state front from California to Ohio.

Thus June 26 is the deadline for filing, by California employer groups and their friends, of 322,000 signatures on an initiative petition to place the "right-to-work" issue on the California ballot next November. A signature-collecting agency is gathering names (at so much per); Senator Knowland has fashioned the right-to-work issue into a cast iron prow for his campaign ship.

Labor partisans say that backers of the petition are spending a minimum of $350,000 to collect the signatures, exclusive of publicity expenses, and exclusive of the money to be spent by Knowland in the gubernatorial race. Knowland's money, they say, must be counted as being right-to-work money, since he has elected to make this the central issue this fall. To meet this onslaught, California labor is trying to raise a dollar from each of its 1.6 million members, but will probably have to settle for half that amount. In all, this means that debate and decision on the right-to-work issue will probably cost from $1.5 million to $3 million in California this year. Similar campaigns are now under way also in Washington, Idaho, Montana, Colorado, Kansas and Ohio.

Unfortunately, despite all this "airing," the nature of the right-to-work issue has remained blurred. Perhaps the chief responsibility for this confusion should be laid to the hidden persuader who first lit upon the slogan "right-to-work." In concrete fact, employers who favor right-to-work have no intention of conferring upon anyone the right to demand a job from them. Today 18 states (mostly in the South) have right-to-work statutes. The first and simplest is that enacted in Florida in 1944. It merely states that "the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or non-membership in any labor union." The other 17 and the seven proposed are, in essence, the same.

This sounds like an eminently fair proposition. More is involved, however, than meets the eye. For, under present law, unions must represent all the workers in a given collective-bargaining unit, whether they are union members or not. This is necessary to maintain some semblance of equality of treatment in the shop.

As a result, except in the right-to-work states, the law permits the inclusion of a union security clause in collective-bargaining contracts. Under these clauses all the workers in a unit must join the union. At one time there was a National Labor Relations Board voting procedure to be followed before the inclusion of such clauses. But, under the procedure, union members expressed themselves so overwhelmingly in favor of the union shop principle, that balloting was discarded as a waste of time and taxpayers' money. Today security clauses become part of a contract through agreement on the employer's part. The union shop in this way does away with free rides for non-members who might otherwise reap the benefits of union representation without paying any of the expenses and carry none of the democratic responsibilities of participation.

The net effect of a right-to-work law is to weaken the hand of unions in collective bargaining; to drain their resources; to compel them to fight constantly for their existence; and to make new organization more difficult. (Why join a union, if you can get its protection without joining?)

The California fight reaches its first climax in a few weeks. Should the right-to-work forces collect the needed signatures for placing their proposition on the ballot, an even more feverish campaign will ensue to convince Californians to vote for it in November.

Mental Hospitals

IT ALL DEPENDS how one takes outgoing American Psychiatric Association President Harry Solomon's suggestion that America's "bankrupt-beyond-remedy" public mental hospitals be liquidated. If the remark is taken at face value, it is obviously ridiculous: no matter how poorly staffed and ill-equipped, the hospitals which shelter, even if they cannot cure, the great number of our 750,000 mental patients are not going to be destroyed tomorrow. Even to suggest liquidation may be dangerous: state legislators who keep a tight rein on meager hospital purse strings may be less inclined to appropriate funds for what an eminent authority tells them is a wasting asset. But if one interprets Dr. Solomon's remarks as an incitement to reform, it is welcome.

Scrapping our public mental hospitals won't help, but reorganizing and supplementing them will. Acutely ill patients should be treated more and more in general hospital psychiatric wards, as is being done in many communities. We should treat long-term, chronically-ill patients in the present state hospitals, but continue to modernize them and rigidly hold new mental hospitals to 1,000 or at the most 1,500 bed limits. These institutions should be supplemented with day hospitals, night hospitals, half-way houses, rehabilitation and after-cure clinics. And finally, we should begin investing a great deal more public and private funds in research and in the training of psychiatric personnel, for it is the dividends from this last investment which could make possible some day shutting down of the huge public mental hospitals once and for all.

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Kennedy Warms Up Wisconsin Democrats

Milwaukee

WE IN Wisconsin see more than our share of political celebrities. Our early Presidential primary, highly regarded as a test of Midwestern political sentiment, is a powerful attraction. Senators Kefauver and Humphrey are as familiar as any Wisconsin politician; Governor Williams flies across Lake Michigan regularly. Senator Knowland has made several visits.

The latest to join this distinguished group is Sen. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, whose recent weekend here was as busy and as hectic as that of a Presidential candidate on tour. No one here doubts that Kennedy will be on the Presidential primary ballot in April, 1960, and Rep. Clement J. Zablocki, a force in Milwaukee politics, has offered to head up Kennedy's slate of delegates.

Kennedy's first visit was during last summer's special Senatorial election, and the success of William Proxmire, for whom he spoke, was in Kennedy's favor. The purpose of the current expedition was to speak at the state party's $25-a-plate fund-raising dinner, but Kennedy crammed a lot of campaigning into his 30 hours in Wisconsin. He made two formal and three informal speeches, held two press conferences, attended three cocktail parties and appeared on a television show.

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To begin with, the Wisconsin Democrats were not totally friendly to Kennedy. Some farmers recalled that he once voted against high rigid price supports; some union officers considered him anti-labor; some Negroes were critical of his vote on civil rights, and many Democrats considered his public statements in regard to the late Senator McCarthy inadequate. There was some talk about the disadvantage of a Catholic candidate and of a wealthy one. In the week before his arrival, the Wisconsin Farmers Union issued a hostile statement, as did an AFL-CIO political action group, and the *Madison Capital Times* denounced the choice of a dinner speaker. Kennedy's greatest handicap here is a general belief, possibly stemming from his support for Vice President by delegations from Southern states, that the young Massachusetts Senator is a "conservative."

Kennedy sought to remedy this impression; he insisted repeatedly that he is a real liberal, associating himself in his talks with those figures whom his audiences recognized as undoubted liberals. (His aides confided that Massachusetts newspapers have called him a "radical.") Most effective, however, was his quiet, casual espousal of positions on legislation—broader unemployment compensation, federal aid for education, the Brannan farm plan—which were unquestionably "liberal." Even Wisconsin Democrats are hesitant about some of these controversial issues.

And he did a lot to reverse opinion on this score. At a luncheon in Milwaukee, a UAW-CIO attorney who had represented the Kohler Company strikers at the hearings in Washington rose to say that Kennedy's conduct at this hearing had been "beyond reproach," and that members of organized labor could have unlimited confidence in the Senator. At press conferences and question periods, he answered questions directly, on the whole, and intelligently. His knowledge of the issues was impressive, and his easy manner and natural dignity attractive. When he evaded a question, it was done so smoothly that the majority of the audience missed the evasion.

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A large University of Wisconsin audience was Kennedy's meat. The students applauded long and loud and trailed after him worshipfully. The regular party dinner was almost as successful. His speech was ordinary fare, a charge that the Eisenhower Administration was not furnishing leadership, and it evoked no demonstrations. But when it was over, there were many whose mild hostility had evaporated, and there were new enthusiasts.

Kennedy's most adroit performance was his handling of a touchy local issue with national ramifications. State Senator Gaylord Nelson, the Democratic candidate for Governor, has attacked the leadership of Senator Lyndon Johnson as too conservative; he has suggested that it might be worth almost any effort to drive Southerners from positions of Democratic leadership. Asked about his position on this, Kennedy indicated that he, too, might prefer the leadership of Senator Humphrey, but that the liberals were in the minority among Senate Democrats. The only way to dump Senator Johnson would be to split the party, and that price was too high. This was cheered by the University students, who considered it common sense.

"Harvard," said one labor union officer, "has had more influence on him than the Catholic church."

A recent poll of Democratic Party leaders here showed that Adlai E. Stevenson was still the overwhelming choice as a Presidential nominee in 1960. Some of these persons said after the dinner that they now had a second choice—Kennedy. If Stevenson keeps himself firmly out of contention, Kennedy will be a formidable candidate in the Wisconsin primary.

EDWIN R. BAYLEY

MR. BAYLEY *reports on politics in the* Milwaukee Journal.

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Politics in California-I

by RONNIE DUGGER

THE ROLE of a prophet is always an uneasy one, but I would venture to predict that, in spite of all the logical explanations and in spite of better organization by the Democratic Party and more unity within, California will be the home of many political independents and the maker of political upsets for some time yet to come. A state which has produced a Hiram Johnson, an Earl Warren, and a Culbert Olson, not to mention a Richard Nixon, and the rising star of Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, hasn't been a dull place and has, in addition, produced a state government which has met successfully the needs of an expanding population and industrial growth unmatched by any other state.

IN A WAY, it would be almost a shame to see California become a predictable and politically normal state. In the 1930's it was known as the home of crackpot social ideas, yet I have the feeling that some of those ideas generated more progressive thoughts and resulted in more progressive actions than might otherwise have been the case.

THE NEW REPUBLIC and Mr. Ronnie Dugger are performing an unusual service in undertaking to clear the fog that generally surrounds a review of the California political situation. Five years from now I hope *The New Republic* will review the changes between this series of articles and the situation which will then exist.

—REP. JAMES ROOSEVELT

A COOL Western day three weeks ago I walked innocent, ignorant, without friends or enemies, across the wide green lawns of the Sacramento capitol grounds into the fearfully complicated labyrinth of California politics. Tonight, in the tradition of the helicopter experts, I know all about it. Not all I saw is in the notes beside me—the bluewater mountain lake Tahoe, the long Pacific seacoast with edges of roads crumbling into foam far below, the "high desert"—joshua-tree-covered and looking as though the sand would be a lover if you lay in it at night, the little Chinese boy in San Francisco sucking on a sherbet stick and holding on to the back of an open trolleycar pulling itself up the track uphill; the appalling quagmire of commercial joints and automobile rivers that is Los Angeles—a city of Auto Park. If one could figure out what is beyond figuring out: why Californians as a whole and one by one do not much care, then the elbow-arm of California might once again scoop up the nation in a muscling revival of hope and reform. With all this movement from morning to evening, and half a million new people a year, no idea is too new, no tradition too deep, no dream too sweet, for the people.

Ever since progressive Hiram Johnson poured his contempt for party politics across the California statute books this has been a no-party state. Across it have stalked first Southern Pacific, then the Progressives, the Otises and Chandlers of the *Los Angeles Times*, Republicans, the "End Poverty in California" followers of Upton Sinclair, the Townsendites, the Earl Warren nonpartisan pro-labor Republicans, and now Pat Brown and his Earl Warren Democrats. Republicans have controlled the state for 64 years, a long sufferance during which only two Democrats have been elected Governor. The legislature has been Republican-dominated throughout the 20th Century except for the 1938 and 1957 terms. In 1952, six years ago, the Republicans controlled the Senate, 29-11, and the Assembly, 54-26; had a 19-11 majority in the Congressional delegation; had both

In coming issues RONNIE DUGGER *will report further on his political tour of California recently completed for this journal. He will survey the state's political past since 1900 and look over Sen. William Knowland's favored Democratic opponent for governor, Edmund G. "Pat" Brown. Mr. Dugger is editor of an independent political weekly,* The Texas Observer.

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United States Senators and the Governor; had 69 percent of the "non-partisan" statewide elective offices. California, although one of the great farm and industrial states with a labor movement now of 1.4 million members, 800,000 Latin Americans, 650,000 Negroes, a substantial number of Orientals, and a large Jewish community, ranked in 1952 as one of the safest Republican fairways on the national course. The California GOP had presented to the nation not only Earl Warren, but also Dick Nixon and William Knowland; the California Democrats had presented no one.

TODAY the Democrats have a 20-20 split in the Senate and have organized that body for the first time since 1889; they have closed the Republicans' majority in the assembly to 43-37 and in Congress to 17-13; they have cut the GOP-held non-partisan offices to 54 percent; they are considered nearly certain to win the governorship for the first time since 1938; and they have an even chance of winning the US Senate seat GOP Senate Minority Leader Knowland resigned to run for Governor so he can run for President. They expect, and are expected, to win out the legislature cleanly by 1960 in time to redistrict the state according to the 1960 census to the extensive benefit of Democrats in California and the US House of Representatives. They are about to present the nation with one Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, an Irish Catholic lawyer from San Francisco who will have little excuse if he is not California's next Governor.

The March unemployment figures for California show 449,000 workers, eight out of every 100 in California, without work. The purchasing power of Los Angeles-Long Beach factory workers fell in March to the lowest level in two and a half years. The Los Angeles cost-of-living index is 125 percent of 1947-1949; San Francisco meat, fruit and vegetable prices went up 9-10 percent the last quarter-year. The cost of living is on everyone's mind. So say the "depth surveys" the pros quote darkly, and so says a box-office girl at the Globe moviehouse in Los Angeles. But Democratic candidates, and particularly Brown, are benefiting not only from the economic discontent but from three really rich Republican goof-ups.

Democrats have had the majorities in voter registration in California since the depression. Their January 1, 1958, margin was 3,215,804 to 2,423,724 Republicans, about four to three, and it is reported larger for the June 3 primary voting. Under Hiram Johnson's cross-filing system, however, any candidate could file on any party ticket without designating his party affiliation, and as UCLA's Dean McHenry has shown, this heavily favored incumbents, mostly Republicans. The first mistake was made in 1954. Republican pundit (and power) Kyle Palmer, political editor of the *Los Angeles Times*, a crinkly-whitehaired man who wears bowties and business suits and sits in a corner of an office at his typewriter opening his own mail and writing his own letters and weekly sending forth the Republicans' Sunday encyclical on the *Times* editorial page, thought to finesse a ballot proposal to abolish cross-filing by advancing as an alternative party labeling of the candidates on the ballots. His alternative passed, and about the same time the Democrats were organizing on a statewide basis. Election-by-popularity-in-the-Republican-press was on the way out.

The second mistake was blundering Bill Knowland's decision to run for Governor against the Republican incumbent, Goodie Knight. Although San Francisco Mayor George Christopher says Knight told him on his honor three times, in the presence of both their wives, he would not run for the Senate, Knight, "cut off at the pockets," as they say, and probably intimidated by firm reports from Washington that Nixon would support Knowland against him, withdrew from the Governor's race and announced for the Senate—Nixon blessing his new candidacy. But not only have the voters refused to smile indulgently upon this penthouse-level game of musical chairs, they are so confused or indignant that slightly more than half of them may vote for little-known Rep. Clair Engle rather than let Knight replace Knowland in Washington.

The third goof is Knowland's all alone. He and only he among the public men is waging a campaign for a right-to-work law in California. Encouraged by excited business support in Los Angeles, Knowland has rejected discreet GOP suggestions the party would like to disavow his position and has thus willfully renounced the pro-labor, mildly-left contrivances by which the Republicans have been outsmarting the more numerous Democrats here for the last two decades. Democrats could vote for Earl Warren and justify it to their friends; the California Federation of Labor could support Goodie Knight as the pork-chops friend he was; but, as Susie Clifton of Brown's staff says, "You vote for Knowland and you're just not a Democrat." Even though many California Democrats are Southern transplants, not many of them are expected to vote for such a high-steam partisan as Knowland. To the contrary, Brown appears to be getting Republican support, exactly as Warren won over many Democrats, with a middlish program.

The various California opinion polls have been one cause of Democratic confidence. Before the Knight-Nixon deal a Facts Consolidated poll showed Knowland winning over Knight for the GOP nomination, 51 percent to 28, and then over Brown, 46-31. A Los Angeles poll in October showed Brown ahead of Knowland 46-41. Late November, the deal jelled, and the California poll showed Brown ahead of Knowland 52-37. A Los Angeles newspaper poll in February showed Brown ahead in Los Angeles only 40-39. A poll of state legislators yielded a 63-43 prediction Brown would win. Brown held on to a 51-40 lead over Knowland in the

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California poll this March, Brown getting 79 percent of the Democratic vote, 13 percent of the Republican, and Knowland getting 80 percent of the Republican vote, only 11 percent of the Democratic. The poll also showed Engle ahead of Knight 48-43.

Of more importance than the polls may be the fact that the registration of new Democrats has been surprisingly heavier than of new Republicans for the June 3 voting. In Alameda, Knowland's county across San Francisco Bay, Democratic registrations are up 25,000, Republican only 9,000. 19,000 new Democrats have registered in San Francisco against 4,000 new Republicans. In Los Angeles County, which has more than four out of every ten California voters, there are 116,000 new Democrats signed up to 45,000 new Republicans. San Bernardino figures show 2,000 new Democrats to a loss of 2,000 Republicans. In other key counties the figures follow the same pattern.

At the same time, the primaries are not expected to be decisive; the Republicans have as yet hardly fired a shot. Knowland has written friends that he plans to return to California and campaign intensely after the primaries and he is known to be a virile campaigner.

Since he is counting on an economic up-turn at mid-year he has taken almost no notice thus far of the recession. His friends know Brown holds the high hand and they must do something to outsmart him. Their problem is that their dealer is right-to-worker Knowland, humorless, grim. Earlier this year Palmer, addressing a stalwart band of Republican women at Solvang, observed, "I have never seen this state in a worse condition for the Republicans, with little hope that it will improve."

Most obviously the national prestige of the Republican Old Guard is at stake. Knowland lost his votes on the bills to regulate labor unions which he sponsored in the Senate, but he cannot lose the office for which he has so boldly bid without seriously discrediting his party's right wing. That wing, however, is not thin-feathered and would no doubt survive.

Knowland is understood to have agreed not to enter any 1960 Presidential primaries. Perhaps this was a consideration for Nixon's promised backing in the Governor's race. (He said of Nixon on March 22, "I know of no one who is likely to contest the nomination with him. I am not a candidate for President.") But Knowland has not said he would refuse a nomination. Several people close to him think he wants to make a good record as Governor and try for the Presidency in 1964, suspecting that 1960 will be a Democratic year. A firm Knowland victory over Brown would make him a more serious challenger for Nixon in 1960, but no one seriously believes the Republican convention would nominate Knowland. Nixon, too, must have calculated, as he helped maneuver his 1956 convention foe, Knight, out of the Governor's race, that even if Knowland wins, Nixon would be better off with Knight shunted off to the Senate or oblivion.

Knowland's defeat would place Nixon in a commanding position two years hence. With Knight compromised and Knowland defeated, California's GOP would have no leader left but Nixon, cleaned up from 1950 and bandaged from his heroic Latin American exploits. The only conceivable California obstacle left in his way would be Warren's candidacy, and Pat Brown, for one, is certain Warren will never leave the bench for politics. Nixon would be best off if he could keep California Republican but make it close. But this is like drawing to an inside straight. Fred Dutton, Brown's campaign manager, wonders, "Is he that good—does he play 'em that close?" Should Brown win, Nixon would have some explaining to do. Why did he fail to help Knowland when Knowland was in need? Does he want a California GOP united behind his own ambitions more than he wants a Republican California?

Defeating Knowland, Brown would become a national Democratic figure. "There is no question at all," he told me in an interview to be reported subsequently, "if I beat Knowland I will be a force to be contended with on the national scene. I have made a definite and irrevocable commitment to serve out my office for four years. That doesn't mean I won't try to make the influence of the people who elected me felt nationally."

CALIFORNIA's role at the party conventions is pivotal: the state has wide open Presidential primaries, it sends the most numerous delegation next to New York, and its name is the first big state on the alphabetical roll call. These facts are not lost on national politicians. Dewey offered the Vice Presidency to Warren in 1942, and Warren accepted it from him in 1948; in 1952 Taft offered the Vice Presidency to Knowland, and Eisenhower to Nixon. Kefauver won the 1952 primary in California, and it took monumental effort to tear him off his steamy charger. Dutton says that since 1955 the Democratic candidates—Kennedy, Meyner, Humphrey—have been finding excuses to visit California about once every three months, making California a "regular Chautauqua for Presidential candidates."

Brown is not to be a candidate in 1960, but Catholic John Kennedy of Massachusetts will be among the contenders. Brown, who 1956 delegates say worked for Kennedy's Vice Presidential nomination in Chicago, is not committed for 1960, of course, and one finds it difficult to see how he might reconcile a Kennedy liaison with his recent promise to California Negro leaders that he will take a Truman-type stand on civil rights at the convention. But if Brown is the favorite son in '60, as Dutton says, "Jeez, you could really trade around."

It would matter to Democrats, too, in the Presidential voting if California had been enjoying a constructive Democratic administration for the first time this century.

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The Disengagement Debate

Which Risks Shall We Take?

by DENIS HEALEY

IN "The Case For Disengagement" (*NR*, March 17, 24, 31), DENIS HEALEY, Member of Parliament and foreign policy specialist in the British Labour Party, set forth his reasons for believing that East-West military withdrawals from a mutually guaranteed and inspected zone in Central and Eastern Europe offer "by far the most hopeful issue on which to concentrate at Summit talks." Mr. Healey's series, which went on where George Kennan's Reith Lectures left off, advocated specifically Soviet evacuation of "at least Eastern Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia" in exchange for Western withdrawal up to but not including the Low Countries and France.

MR. HEALEY here responds to critiques of his proposals in *The New Republic* by Contributing Editor JAMES E. KING, JR., LOUIS J. HALLE, KLAUS KNORR, EDWARD L. KATZENBACH, JR. and others.

NO ONE will disagree that the present situation in Europe is unsatisfactory from the Western viewpoint in both its military and political aspects. But a policy of military disengagement by the USSR and the West would also have its dangers and disadvantages. The question is whether, on balance, disengagement offers better prospects of maintaining peace than the present policy—or alternatively, as James King pointed out in his comments on my original proposal, whether there is some way of removing the weaknesses of our present situation without embarking on the entirely novel course of disengagement.

It is refreshing for a European supporter of disengagement to find *New Republic* contributors discussing the problem in this spirit, with careful calculation of relative benefit and risk. But it must be recognized that we ought not simply to compare the *status quo* with the sort of "blueprint for disengagement" which I put forward (*NR*, March 24, 1958). For there is nothing static about the present situation of the Western alliance, just as there could be nothing permanently rigid about the alternative settlement I propose. What we ought to do is to compare trends; compare the risks and disadvantages of continuing to base Western policy on the assumption that hostile blocs permanently confront one another along an unnatural frontier, with those of trying to reverse the postwar trend by seeking to find security in certain fields through cooperation rather than conflict with the Soviet Union on the basis of certain common interests.

The "blueprint" which I put forward—with stated reservations—represented what I consider would be a reasonable sort of objective for such a policy over a period of years. But I tried to show in my last article that though one's immediate aim must be considerably more modest, one's ultimate aim must be much bolder.

The one thing on which I agree whole-heartedly with George Kennan is that the Cold War and the hydrogen bomb have chained humanity to an infernal machine which will drag it to catastrophe unless its course can be reversed. This type of Hobbesian predicament is familiar to all students of history. But I am sanguine enough to believe that men make their own history, and that we have a duty to seek escape from such predicaments, even though sturdy pessimists like Mr. King reproach us with reaching for pie in the sky.

What struck me most about the searching contributions from your American correspondents was that on the whole their interest focuses on a different area of the problem from that which concerns most Europeans. And it is precisely this divergence between America and Europe which is responsible for some of the most disturbing features of the present situation. Europeans tend to feel that the Western military posture, though theoretically imperfect, presents few practical risks so long as America remains generally committed to their defense; thoughtful Americans, however, have come to believe that unless NATO can reconstruct its strategy to meet the needs of limited war the alliance may become involved in some local military conflict with the intolerable choice between suicide and surrender. On the other hand, Americans seem to face the political division of Germany and Europe with equanimity if not approval, whatever their formal obeisances to allied susceptibilities; but Europeans have begun to feel, particularly since Hungary, that the division of their continent and of its most powerful nation is both morally unacceptable and dangerous to peace.

Personally, I agree with the American view on the military problem and with the European view on the

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political one. But because there is no common view on either at the government level, a four-way split is developing inside NATO between America and Europe on both defense and foreign policy. And the consequences of this split, however much we may deplore them, are among the most dangerous elements in the predicament from which disengagement offers an escape.

I fully share your correspondents' concern about the weaknesses of present NATO strategy. America's capacity for massive thermonuclear retaliation is no longer a safe deterrent against local aggression. Now that all-out war means both suicide and genocide, the Western alliance must develop the doctrine and capacity for limited war. While I share Mr. King's desire for more conventional forces, I agree with Louis Halle that NATO needs the capacity for limited atomic war as well, so that Russia is not tempted to employ more conventional forces than NATO can reasonably be expected to contain. I also agree with Mr. Halle as against both Mr. King and Edward Katzenbach that beyond a certain point the advantage of superior numbers even in limited atomic war is irrelevant, since in any case war can only be limited if both sides are aware that victory can be won at too high a cost. But for this reason, so long as it is our aim to deter or contain all forms of aggression rather than win wars in the pre-atomic sense, I believe the cost of providing NATO with the necessary range of weapons and personnel might be less than Mr. Katzenbach and Professor Klaus Knorr imagine. In my opinion the scale of massive retaliation now envisaged by the United States at the level of all-out war is out of all proportion to any military, political or moral end. It is here that the major economic savings should be sought. If, as some American writers seem to suggest, NATO must aim at achieving a decisive superiority over Russia simultaneously in every possible field of warfare, then indeed the arms race is likely to bankrupt both sides—as no one has demonstrated more cogently than Professor Knorr.

If NATO could now succeed in producing a flexible capacity for limited war, many of the dangers of the present situation would be reduced, as Mr. King rightly shows. Moreover, as other correspondents point out, such a capacity would be needed in any case to provide military sanctions against the violation of a zone of disengagement. There is no disagreement between us here. But unfortunately the political realities in Western Europe make such a solution most improbable for the time being, even if, as is not the case, the US itself were to lead the way by example. The trouble is that a decade of over-reliance on massive retaliation as a military cure-all has produced its effect on America's allies. They believe that the H-bomb is the only sure protection against attack, and that if they can no longer rely on American H-bombs, they must have H-bombs of their own. Moreover, since all the exercises in limited atomic war so far fought by NATO involved destruction for the countries in the battlefield indistinguishable from that they would suffer in all-out war, the very conception of limited war has been discredited as a selfish denial of allied solidarity. Finally, since President Eisenhower has failed to get the McMahon Act amended so that the allies can receive at least small-yield weapons for themselves, a strategy of limited war would leave them as wholly dependent on the US as the strategy of massive retaliation, without the consolation that there was equality of risk.

The result is that Britain has already set Europe the example of building an independent thermonuclear striking force at the expense of her contribution to the alliance. The Continental countries are likely to follow suit as soon as they are physically able to do so; meanwhile they will insist that America should remain ready to commit suicide on their behalf. This desire for independent thermonuclear capacity is inspired as much by political as military motives. A French Socialist deputy said during a recent debate on Algeria that once France had her own bomb she would no longer need Anglo-American "good offices." The German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss suggested last February that once Germany had atomic weapons she would be able to compel the Western and Eastern powers to reunite her. Thus, if the present trend continues, Dr. Oppenheimer's picture of Russia and the US as two scorpions in a bottle is likely to turn into one which is far more disturbing —a bottleful of scorpions all jostling for supremacy. The balance of mutual terror is a reasonable concept so long as there are only two powers in the balance and both are sufficiently satisfied with the *status quo* to calculate the risks of war with caution. It cannot be applied to a world of many thermonuclear powers, some of which feel their situation so intolerable that they may be tempted to use force to change it.

It is here that Americans seem as blind to Europe's view of the political situation as Europe is blind to America's view of the strategic situation. Now that Western Germany has recovered her economic strength and is well on the road to becoming the strongest military power on the Continent, the recovery of her national unity is bound to assume increasing priority in her foreign policy. Mr. King is wildly out of date in believing the Germans will be prepared much longer to cooperate in a Western policy, which, as he made embarrassingly clear in his articles, assumes that they remain permanently divided because they are easier to control that way. Moreover, present NATO policy, by pressing atomic weapons on the Germans with the argument that they will otherwise be second-class allies, seems determined to destroy any possibility of controlling them as members of the alliance.

Even less realistic is the view of Mr. King and some other correspondents that such Little European institutions as the Schuman Plan or Common Market can either

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control the Germans or divert their attention from the recovery of national unity. On the contrary, these institutions are certain to be dominated by Western Germany—or, to the extent that they are founded on the assumption that Germany must never be united, they are certain to collapse. No long-term Western policy for Germany makes sense unless it not only passively allows for, but also actively promotes, the recovery of German unity. And since Soviet military strength rules out the use of force to reunite Germany, the West must have a policy for obtaining German unity by negotiation which involves concessions by both sides. Mr. King's suggestion that NATO should organize itself to back military intervention by the West Germans in the Soviet Zone would be the quickest way of wrecking NATO altogether.

The only comfort in this situation is that Russia must fear the consequences of West German nuclear armaments even more than Germany's Western allies. This is the most important common interest which could bring the two sides together. *The validity of disengagement depends on the assumption that all the countries concerned have certain interests which can better be satisfied by cooperation than by allowing the present trend to continue.* Through disengagement America and Russia would obtain a settlement in an area dangerous to both of them on terms which left their power unimpaired both relative to one another and relative to the rest of the world. Germany would regain her national unity; the satellite countries would win greater political freedom. And the world as a whole would benefit from the establishment of cooperation between the major rival power blocs in a regional project for the control of armaments.

On the other hand, as I stressed in my last article, full disengagement in Central Europe can be neither the beginning nor the end of the process; what is involved is no less than reversing the whole trend of postwar politics by substituting cooperation for conflict between the major powers. Unless disengagement in Central Europe is followed by political cooperation and disarmament in other parts of the world, it is unlikely to remain a permanent settlement. Conversely, neither Russia nor the West would at this moment agree to full disengagement in Central Europe as including the total evacuation of foreign troops and the political neutralization of the area. The most it is reasonable to hope for at present is some agreement on a balanced limitation of both atomic and conventional forces in a definite area of Central Europe under effective international control.

This is the one issue on which I have come to disagree with Professor Knorr. His arguments against a limited agreement for thinning-out the opposing military forces are relevant so far as they go. But I believe they are not decisive. In the first place, a thinning-out is taking place on the Western side in any case—without any attempt to link this with parallel concessions by the Russians. And the really encouraging thing is that, instead of taking advantage of those unilateral Western withdrawals, Russia is thinning out her forces too—to such an extent that some Western intelligence sources believe there will be only 35,000 troops on each side of the German frontier by the end of this year.

I believe that the West could only gain by formally recognizing such a balance of forces and having it submitted to international verification and control. This would not only make it more difficult for Russia later to upset the balance; the public acceptance by Russia of force limitations and the physical presence in Eastern Europe of international inspectors would also reduce Russia's ability to threaten military intervention against satellite regimes which were moving toward greater freedom. If such a system worked in practice, it would encourage those on both sides of the Iron Curtain who wanted to move toward full-scale disengagement. At worst a limited agreement of this type would gain time for a rational readjustment of NATO strategy. Without it, irreparable steps may soon be taken which lead to the disintegration of the Western alliance.

PERHAPS I should end with a confession. I am not, like Mr. Halle, enamored of disengagement as a word. It is misleading insofar as it focuses attention on the physical separation of military forces. As I hope I have made clear, military disengagement is only possible on the basis of political cooperation between Russia and the West in the zone between them—cooperation based on the recognition of overriding common interests even if the basic ideological hostility remains.

The United Nations itself was formed on the assumption that such overriding common interests do exist, and that world order could be built on the basis of a minimal cooperation between the great powers. It was too optimistic an assumption 13 years ago. Can it be made more true today?

I do not know for certain—nor does anyone else. But I do know that if the West continues to act on the opposite assumption while Russia appears willing to test it out, the West will continue to lose heavily in the battle for public opinion all over the world.

Now that neither America nor Russia exercises automatic authority even in its own camp, and a third of the world has declared its neutrality, a rigid adherence to the slogans of 10 years ago can only damage the Western cause. It is natural enough that individuals like to prove their detractors posthumously wrong. But nothing does more harm to America's standing abroad than the irritable and pharisaic conservatism displayed by the leaders of both the great US political parties when a new idea is thrown into the discussion of foreign policy. It was by being ardent, audacious and imaginative that America won her greatness. Her friends are waiting desperately for her to show those qualities again.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

Government as a Creative Act

by Gerald W. Johnson

STARTLED, I confess, by the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature to Albert Camus, I have re-read, this time with close attention, *L'Homme Revolté* in Anthony Bowers' translation which Knopf published in 1954 under the title of *The Rebel*. My object was to learn something more about Camus, but my accomplishment was to learn much more about the inscrutability of the United States from the standpoint of a European intellectual.

Camus devotes some 275 pages of vigorous and profound reasoning to an analysis of the difference between the spirit of rebellion and that of revolution. His conclusion is that their inherent qualities doom rebellion to partial and revolution to total defeat; for rebellion, if completely successful, becomes revolution, and revolution, completely successful, deteriorates either into tyranny, or into nihilism, and the transformation annihilates revolution. But rebellion, checked before it becomes revolution, acquires permanence and the possibility of becoming the dynamism of art, science and philosophy.

It is a resourceful and powerful argument, but nowhere does Camus cite the case that goes furthest toward proving his point, the record of the United States. Such references as he does make to this country indicate that he failed to cite this case because he is unaware of its existence. Imagination may boggle at the suggestion that a learned and brilliant French thinker never heard of the United States, but the thesis may be defended with some plausibility.

The defense begins with a definition of terms. M. Camus is of course familiar with United States Steel, General Motors, the Chase National Bank and Hemingway; he has not overlooked our enormous production of economic goods and hard-boiled novels, and he concedes that America is a master of production, but he will not admit that it is capable of creation. It is a reasonable inference, then, that he regards steel, motors, finance and Hemingway as representing the essential America.

This the defender of the thesis must deny, albeit with some chagrin. We are defeated by our success. The brilliance of our productive achievements has obscured our creative achievement to such an extent that even a philosopher is not disposed to credit its existence. Camus never quotes the dictum, "Though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable." Yet it is precisely the doctrine that Camus has been preaching, and it is the mainspring of American political philosophy.

Here is repudiation of total revolution. Here is frank acceptance of the partial defeat of rebellion. Here is that recognition of necessity that we call realism, accompanied by a challenge of its moral authority, which is the essence of idealism. Here, in brief, is Camus' doctrine of limits set forth explicitly by the head of a state a hundred and fifty-odd years ago. Why does he ignore it?

A facile explanation is that his attention was concentrated so exclusively on American production that he missed this creative act entirely; but that assumes that Camus can be dazzled by superficial glare, which denigrates him as a philosopher.

Somewhat more acceptable is the theory that it was an instinctive, rather than a carefully reasoned rejection; for even philosophers are not immune to instinctive revolts when a laboriously built logical structure is threatened. Camus cannot agree that this principle is the heart and soul of American political philosophy without choosing between alternatives, either of which is difficult: he must agree that Thomas Jefferson was a much more profound thinker than the world has believed, or he must accept serious damage to his own theory by admitting an exception of large dimensions.

As a matter of historical fact, Jefferson was not propounding an original idea, but merely expressing succinctly a theory that had long been familiar to most of his countrymen. But this smashes a tremendous breach in the theory that there is something inherent in rebellion that impels it into revolution. That has indeed been the course of successful rebellion in Europe; but extraneous conditions, not the nature of rebellion, may have been the impelling force.

CAMUS notes that rebellion, flushed with success, proceeds into revolution by going from regicide to deicide, liquidating first the King and then God; but he does not admit that it may be driven to do so by necessities that are not only extraneous, but also are limited in time and space.

For instance, there is no convincing evidence that the rebellion of the British North American colonies differed in its essential nature from the rebellions that led to the French and Russian revolutions. But in the American case the king was three thousand miles distant, which eliminated the possibility of regicide; and the Church was only partially and feebly established, which is to say, it was not thoroughly identified with God, which eliminated the necessity of what Camus calls deicide. And in that case rebellion, left to its own devices free of outside pressure, did not proceed into total—that is to say, social, economic and religious as well as political—revolution, but paused, content with a limited success.

It is possible to argue, then, that the presence of the king and the establish-

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ment of the church, not anything inherent in rebellion, are the proximate causes of regicide and deicide.

Lest this be dismissed as a mere explosion of parochialism, I hasten to point out that it reflects no particular credit on Americans, who neither designed geography nor arranged history. The merit that attaches to Jefferson and his contemporaries is merely that of having imposed some semblance of form and order upon the external world in which they found themselves. But if it comes to that, what more is M. Camus trying to do? What more did Plato do? What else is the function of philosophy?

Analysis of the Jeffersonian dictum leads into a philosophical maze that should be the delight of the dissectors of thought. "The will of the majority is in all cases to prevail"—an affirmation of the most positive—"but to be rightful, it must be reasonable"—envisaging the possibility that it may be unreasonable, therefore wrongful. Hence it is right that the wrong should prevail if it is the will of the majority, yet wrong to admit that it is right, no matter whose opinion it is. That is to say, the duty of protest is asserted, and protest is the seed of rebellion, indeed, is itself intellectual rebellion, but rebellion without regicide, deicide, or even homicide, that is, rebellion subject to Camus' doctrine of limits. If and when it is held within limits, it may become permanent, an eventuality approved by the Frenchman.

Conventional logic holds that a political system subject to the strain of incessant rebellion must necessarily be an unstable system, but that is true only if the rebellion proceeds as far as homicide. If the system is sufficiently elastic to absorb revolt without murder, it may be astonishingly durable; and the erection of a system with such elasticity is a creation if ever there was one.

The inescapable inference is that Camus, with many other European thinkers, is looking in the wrong place for the proof of American creative accomplishment. They naturally turn to the field in which European creative ability has shone most brilliantly and they find no very impressive American contribution to art and philosophy. It rarely occurs to a European to look to the field in which Europe has been least successful, that of constitutional government.

They are the less likely to turn in that direction because Americans have never been conspicuously successful at the systematization of thought. Oh, yes, we have Charles Pierce and William James and, for the dilettanti, Henry Adams, as well as such *Fauves* as Veblen and George, but no platoons of abstract cogitators, such as every European university turns out. Our thought, especially on the theory of politics, is unconventional, therefore largely unrecognized. Perhaps, indeed, it is not thought, but intuition; even so, it should be susceptible of schematic treatment.

Without it, the European intellectual is bound to encounter some difficulty in readily understanding the American system or, as F. L. Allen would have it, lack of system. The scheme may eventually be supplied by an American, but the probability is that it will come from some less superficial Tocqueville who will understand why an American who was so far from being a pure theorist that he practiced statecraft with immense success could confess partiality for a little rebellion now and then.

The idea of stability as the resultant of opposing tensions is elementary physics but it was left to James Madison to introduce it formally into politics, and he touched it only in one short essay, the paper known as Federalist, Number Ten. But it is worth the extended study of such a thinker as Camus, for it is conceivable that it is the motive power of the fabulous American production of economic goods; and if it is not, to establish the dissociation might be as important as to prove the contrary.

The Two Worlds of C. P. Snow

by Charles Curran

IF YOU want to know the truth about an Englishman, you ask first where he went to school. The answer tells you pretty accurately at what level in his country's social structure he was born. Sir Charles Percy Snow, the novelist, discloses in the British *Who's Who* that he went to a day-school in the provincial city of Leicester. From this fact, you may infer that he does not belong by origin to the governing class—which sends its sons not to provincial day-schools, but to the great private boarding establishments misleadingly called Public Schools.

The Conscience of the Rich, by C. P. Snow (Scribners; $3.95).

But he has entered it, by way of Cambridge University, and made himself at home there. For his *Who's Who* biography adds "Civil Service Commissioner since 1945." Those words reveal that Sir Charles (he is 53; he received his knighthood last year) is indeed a mighty man.

The Civil Service Commission has three heads, like Cerberus, the dog that guarded the gates of Hades. These three men fix the qualifications, and hold the examinations, for everyone seeking admission to Britain's bureaucracy. They date from 1855, when Britain abandoned jobbery and favoritism as the methods whereby she recruited her permanent officials, and substituted competitive tests of intelligence. As a Civil Service Commissioner, therefore, C. P. Snow—to give him the initials by which he is usually known—is a triumvir who carries the keys to the power-house in his briefcase.

During his upward march, he has found time to write a series of novels, under the general title of *Strangers and Brothers*. Each is complete in itself; but they all have the same theme. They all portray, from changing angles, the world inhabited by the British governing class—that private, dimly-lighted world of politicians, permanent officials, dons, bishops, administrators, bankers, lawyers, industrialists and their encircling womenfolk who together compose the area of decision. A good many people have tried to describe it. But nobody, it may be said with confidence, has made a better job of charting it than Snow. These novels are like nothing else in English; they are a unique contribution to the practice, as distinct from the theory, of government.

All of them—they now number seven, and I see no reason why they should not stretch out indefinitely, like the line of

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ghosts that marched past Macbeth—are constructed like a panopticon around the personality of Lewis Eliot, who recurs in each one. Eliot is himself a *novus homo,* an intellectual parvenu who rises like a kite in a high wind, lifted aloft from modest beginnings by his brains. In Britain, broadly speaking, you must make up your mind whether you want power, or whether you prefer your picture in the papers. Like his creator, Eliot made his choice early. He is for power; he is fascinated by the people who exercise it.

In *The Conscience of the Rich,* Eliot fixes his stare on the position of the Jew in the British governing class. Before his seeing eye is Lewis March, head of a great banking family whose brother is a Cabinet Minister, and whose son is married to a Jewish girl who belongs to the Communist Party. The girl supplies a Communist scandal sheet with smear material about the Minister. Her husband is pressed by his father to stop her campaign. The time is the 1930's, with Hitler opening like a giant mushroom in the European sky.

It is a good, dramatic plot, a literary trapeze on which Snow swings with a torch in his hand, lighting up the network of tensions, ambitions, jealousies, suspicions and divided loyalties that lie below. The pressures of pre-war anti-Fascism, acting on Jews and non-Jews, are recorded with the precision of a barometric instrument. If genius were simply a capacity for taking infinite pains, *The Conscience of the Rich* would be a work of genius. It is not. For all his care and craftsmanship, Snow does not here succeed in supplying the indefinable literary vitamin that turns the good into the superlative. (He did it in an earlier book, *The Masters,* when he studied, like Capablanca analysing an end-game in chess, a disputed election for the headship of a Cambridge college.)

ALL THE SAME, this is—by any standards except his own—a magnificent novel. There is a queer fascination about it, as there was about its predecessors. *Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner* is only a half-truth for Snow. He understands, but he does not forgive. He sits, a sleepless spider, at the center of his web; and he appraises his characters rather as a spider might sum up the flies. He is as cold as the frosty Caucasus, as pitiless as Rhadamanthus. He dissects human motives like a surgeon manipulating the muscles of a cadaver before an audience of medical students.

It is an expert dissection, with authority in every sentence of his explanation. Even if Snow were an indifferent writer, he would still be worth reading by anybody who wishes to learn how Britain is governed. For he has studied the people who do it like an eager anthropologist set down in a primitive tribe. He knows their customs, their taboos, the mixture of tacit assumptions and rule-of-thumb *expertise* on which they act. He is their Frazer and their Margaret Mead.

Sainthood for Savonarola?

by Robert Evett

FEW victims of medieval and renaissance ecclesiastical courts have been posthumously rehabilitated and canonized. Joan of Arc is one of those who come to mind. There is, however, considerable activity in the Roman communion to procure this same honor for Fra Girolamo Savonarola, and it is evidently toward this end that Mr. de la Bedoyere has written his book. While the book does not represent the offical Catholic position (under which Savonarola is still excommunicant), it does carry the Imprimatur of a British Vicar General—a sign signifying that nothing in the book is at odds with Catholic faith or doctrine. And since Savonarola's career transpired at the apex of the degradation of the Papacy, this study is particularly valuable as a reflection of what many Catholics feel about the most disgraceful period in the history of their church.

The Meddlesome Friar and the Wayward Pope, by Michael de la Bedoyere (Doubleday; $4).

The pope at that time—the 1490's—was Rodrigo Borgia, who received the tiara under the name of Alexander VI. He was the father of Lucrezia and Cesare Borgia, and is generally thought to have been an expert poisoner as well as a very sexy old party. He liked the ladies and kept quantities of them at the Vatican. It is pretty well established that he got his office by buying off the College of Cardinals; and, according to one Catholic tradition, he went straight to hell on the instant of his death.

De la Bedoyere concedes that Alexander was the worst possible pope, but points out that the sins of His Holiness are legendary in the sense of having grown in number and magnitude through the years. It is generally forgotten, for instance, that this pope was committed to religion at the age of six and made a cardinal at 14. It is hardly surprising that, given the standards of the Roman Curia at the time, he fathered a sizable brood of bastards while efficiently pursuing (through the four previous papal reigns) a series of taxing Vatican positions. Few moderns would condemn him for his roving eye, his political astuteness, or even his alleged atheism—all vices appropriate to a successful Career Churchman of the high renaissance. It is, I think, his rumored penchant for homicide—which Bedoyere does nothing whatever to dissipate—which makes Alexander VI seem like a really wicked person as well as a bad and hypocritical pope.

SAVONAROLA, on the other hand, was the deadly enemy of all forms of worldly pleasure. By the eloquence of his preaching, he contrived to get hold of the political power in Florence; and, having done that, he seems to have done his best to keep anybody from having a good time. De la Bedoyere denies that Savonarola was a prototype of the puritan divine, but also neglects to give a catalog—the familiar one—of the works of literature and painting that were burnt in Florence under the Friar's reign. Incidentally, Savonarola was 500 years ahead of Orwell: he turned the children into a police force, and no adult was safe from them. The only point he appears to have had in common with the pope was a light regard for human life; he was given to screaming for executions from the pulpit of the Duomo.

In order to present Savonarola's quar-

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rel with the pope as something more than a squabble between two almost-equally unsavory characters, it's a good thing to take sides in advance, as Mr. de la Bedoyere does here. The author has two points to make. One (which he makes very well) is that as a priest and prior, Savonarola owed obedience to the office of the pope, even though the pope was a bad one. The other (which I find less convincing) is that, though Savonarola was given to the excesses of his time—including excesses of cruelty—he was, at bottom, a charitable man, with a vision of moral reform. The unanswered question is whether the excesses of this century can be reconciled to the idea of "charity."

Savonarola knew that the pope had been elevated by a rigged election, and was, therefore perhaps, not pope at all. The friar attempted to get the kings of France, England and Spain to call a General Council of the Church to depose Alexander. After word of this got out, it was only a few weeks until Savonarola was on trial for his life. It could be argued, that when Savonarola cracked (as he repeatedly did) under precisely the same torture to which he had sent others, it was punishment for pride. He was presently convicted of heresy and schism, then hanged and burnt on May 24, 1498.

SINCE his death, many people have continued to regard Savonarola a saint. Martin Luther considered him a proto-martyr of the Reformation; Catholics of the counter-Reformation. That he is being championed for rehabilitation at this time is an indication of the prevailing moral tenor of the Roman Church, with its heavy emphasis on the virtues of austerity.

That Savonarola could be considered a saint in heaven while excommunicated from the Church on earth is illustrated by an anecdote about his execution. The archbishop is reported to have said "I excommunicate you from the Church Militant" (*i.e.*, the Church on earth) ". . . and Triumphant." (*i.e.*, heaven). To which Savonarola replied, "From the Church Militant. Not from the Church Triumphant. That is not within your competence." In 1952, the city of Florence made a solemn act of reparation for Savonarola's death; and it is likely that the Church Militant will follow suit.

MOVIES

The Hollywood Tragedy, a la *Chayefsky*

WITH his well-known and much-praised *Marty*, Paddy Chayefsky became established as a dramatic writer of some talent and, specifically, as the inventor of a dialogue technique, which rendered with remarkable exactitude the way real people with real speech difficulties manage to make themselves understood by perpetually asking each other if one knows what another means, if you know what I mean. *Marty* was followed by *The Bachelor Party*, which was a disappointment; the characters hadn't got any more articulate, but this time the author himself didn't seem to know quite what *he* meant; and critics began to complain about the "limitations" of the Chayefsky method.

The Goddess (Columbia).

Mr. Chayefsky must have taken this criticism to heart, for his latest film, *The Goddess*, is a radical and ambitious departure from his previous mode. The film is, according to himself, "tragedy, Greek tragedy," and spans no less than 27 years in the life of its heroine, who starts in a Southern shanty, as an underprivileged child and ends up in Hollywood, as a famous, but incurably psychotic, movie queen. In between we get a kind of refresher course, by selected example, of just about everything that has been done in theatre and film for the past 20 years or so. For what Mr. Chayefsky has done is become a Serious Playwright. He has graduated from hanging about street corners or bars, exercising what has been called his "good ear," and now evidently sits at home poring over O'Neill and Williams dialogue, for which he has no ear at all.

The Goddess begins on a portentous note. The frivolous young widow of a recent suicide has descended upon two of her relatives for the purpose, it soon comes out, of foisting Emily Ann, her four year-old daughter, on them so that she may be free to make a second marriage with a man who dislikes children. But the relatives aren't having any, and presently the lady is moved to declare, with great feeling, "I don't want her! I don't want her! . . . I didn't want her when she was born, and I don't want her now!" At these words the camera dashes out of the room, up to the dark at the top of the stairs, and there fixes its stare on the huddled little form of you know whom. The child has heard everything, and you can be sure, she is never going to let us forget it.

At eight, when next we meet her, she is already displaying signs of mental disintegration, and by the time she reaches adolescence, when Kim Stanley takes over the part, there isn't much of a part left. Not only is the girl difficult, she also has an extremely low Intelligence Quotient. Her adolescence, we are given to know, is spent in the back seats of young men's cars—a pastime she doesn't enjoy, but how else, as she tearfully in-

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quires, is a poor girl to get dates? Another girl under such circumstances might decide to go without dates, and take up volley-ball instead, but this evidently never occurred to our heroine.

Soon thereafter she makes a disastrous marriage with an intellectual named John Towers, whom she stumbled across one day on the street, where he was lying face down. *His* trouble is being the child of a matinee idol who denied him love and psychiatric care—the latter on grounds of already having one crazy son, "and that's enough for me," which is a nice conceit, but hardly explains why Towers carriers on the way he does. (Drink, suicide attempts, the dull despairing ache. . . .) The marriage is presently dissolved and Emily Ann does one better on her mother, by abandoning the child and flouncing off to Hollywood; where in due time, by sleeping with producers, she achieves her goal. She becomes a Movie Star.

RICHES and fame, as you might expect, have a far from salutory effect on the recipient's mental health, and before you know it, she has gone completely off her chump. On hearing of this the mother, who has become a Seventh Day Adventist, comes out for a visit, and actually succeeds in making a convert of Emily Ann. Religion seems to be of great help. Emily Ann starts combing her hair; even her I.Q. goes up.

But no cheap endings for Mr. Chayefsky. No sooner does Emily find God, than she carelessly loses Him again; two days later we're exactly back where we started. "There ain't no God! You hear what I say? There ain't no God!" she screams after the retreating form of the mother, "you never cared whether I lived or died. Well, just get out of my house . . . I never want to see you again, not even in your grave!"

But she does, in the scene with which the film ends. John Towers shows up for the occasion, accompanied by the child and greatly changed for the better. He's discovered fatuity (we all need someone to love) and generously offers Emily the chance to come and share it with him. But—and this, reader, is the tragedy—it's too late. Nothing can save our heroine now from her hideous fate. And what is that? Why, to go on being as tiresome as she always was.

JANET WINN

ART

Juan Gris, the Cubest Cubist

TWO completely extraneous circumstances lent an unexpected appropriateness to the Juan Gris exhibition at New York's museum of Modern Art, wrenching the whole tone from one of belated recognition back to the frustration and second string status that bedevilled Gris during his lifetime and have stunted his reputation since his death. One was the overlap of the Gris show with the Seurat show. At this point in time Seurat's achievement seems much more substantial, certainly much more his own, than Gris'. We've all been brought up to the special importance of innovators and Seurat was one, Gris was not. Seurat also had the habit of painting masterpieces. Of his small finished production, five would qualify and one, the Grande Jatte, is one of the great pictures of Western art. Nothing in Gris' work approaches either the immediate impact or the staying power that Seurat manages regularly. You recognize a Gris instantly and you can tick off the characteristics and objects of his paintings, but the paintings don't establish themselves in your memory as forcefully as Seurat's. Even negatively, the inevitable comparison worked against Gris: he died at 40; Seurat died at 31.

The second circumstance, of course, was the fire at the Modern. The Gris paintings escaped damage, as did the Seurats, but it was the latter that people were vocally concerned about. ("My God! that's over a dollar a dot!" a fireman said when told the Grande Jatte was worth a million.) The fire itself became the prime art event at the museum. Most important, almost a third of the exhibition time went up, you might say, in smoke, and no extension was possible.

Gris' record of tough luck remains unblemished, then, by his big show at the Modern. The show itself reveals that the Spaniard deserved better than he got. Perhaps he was born too late and died too soon. Perhaps it's a mistake to hang around with the giants of the age if you're not quite a giant yourself and if those who are are older than you and longer-lived by three decades. At any rate the Gris show at the Modern reveals a fully developed and original approach to cubism, one that should not be dismissed as a branch office of Picasso *et* Braque, still less as the chief of that *societe anonyme* that made a fashion out of what for Gris was fate.

THE earliest painting in the show is a still life and reveals the Cezanne link more clearly than the later cubism of Gris or anyone else. A kettle, a pot, a cup and a book are grouped at the edge of a table and all display the geometrical basis the older artist saw in mountains, apples, bathers and country architecture. Almost at once, though, other things begin happening in Gris' work and it seems increasingly unlikely, as the show proceeds, that "cubism" was such a hot name after all. The geometry, for one thing, becomes plane. The composition becomes fancy. Shadow is revived. One of the great scholastic debates of impressionism had been over how many colors could dance in a shadow. Gris unhesitatingly made them black again. When he did he discovered a whole new apparatus for making involved but intensely unified pictures, the reverse image. White becomes black when it casts a shadow and these positives and negatives can build like fugues all over the canvas. The simile is not loose. Gris' cubism is highly musical in its structure. Not by accident are the guitar and the violin never absent very long from his art.

The checkerboard, I am convinced, figures in the same way. First and foremost, of course, this plane of alternating squares is marvellously suited to what Gris is up to. It can suggest a false perspective. It can be translucent or even transparent. One placed on top of another yields dazzling patterns. At the same time, the game of checkers itself is an exercise in manipulating abstract

Notes on Contributors

GERALD W. JOHNSON, a contributing editor of this journal, is the author of a new book: *Peril and Promise, An Inquiry into Freedom of the Press.* CHARLES CURRAN is political commentator for the British weekly, *The Spectator.*

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forces, thus creating new relationships of power and ultimately achieving an absolute harmony. Surely this is cubist painting as practiced by Gris. Confronted with his work, it is necessary for us to play the game all over again with him, making every move, perceiving for ourselves the infinite fracturing of reality and how each new fragment relates to the others.

But is this all, an intricate game to pass an idle hour at the rate of about three minutes a picture? No, there's more. The geometry becomes plane and plane surfaces of all kinds drift loose from their moorings. Graining and caning leave table and chair to become free elements. From a sideboard a swatch of marble balances in air—the artist as prophet: Gris predicts formica. A Roman key motif falls from the cornice, but halts its fall in midpainting. The title line of the daily paper leaves the edition and becomes eternal. At the same time the objects deprived of their surfaces are flattened into profiles and become new surfaces. At the same time color, as arbitrarily handled as shape and surface, is rich, restrained and, all by itself, lovely to look at.

TWO THINGS, it seems to me, emerge from this orderly hurricane let loose upon life's surfaces. Gris holds a key position in the general movement of the century's art into privacy. He paints, again and again, the homely objects of the private residence; his is thus a privacy we all can share. While he was working, the violently public art of dada was modulating into the dreambook of surrealism, which, in New York painting of the moment, has become about as private as you can get. Secondly, his whole effort is a quite literal and quite successful attempt to grasp the scheme of things, shatter it not to bits but to pieces and remold it nearer to the heart's desire.

The Gris show will be in Minneapolis, San Francisco and Los Angeles throughout the summer and fall. About the fire: the museum's losses were covered by insurance, but the trustees have decided to replace the temporary structures which caused the trouble with permanent, fireproof material. This takes money and money will be gratefully received by the Friends of the Modern, 11 West 53rd St.

FRANK GETLEIN

A Communication

(Continued from page 3)

NR article of April 21, is boiling furiously in the Harvard teapot. Nor, I think, would it be worth the candle. To find a robbery in one's own neighborhood more absorbing than a war in Egypt is a normal human weakness. And since it is a weakness to which Harvardians (or, as some of them were calling themselves when I last visited among them, "Cantabrigians") seem peculiarly susceptible, one can understand that the dropping of a pebble in Harvard Yard sounds more loudly in local ears than the dropping of a bomb in Nevada. Out my way, we hardly heard the pebble at all.

I AM, however, disturbed by what seems to be Mr. Bartley's assumption that Harvard (and therefore the world?) has but two alternatives. One alternative is, he suggests, a revival of a "religiosity" which will be Christian, Protestant, orthodox and sectarian (he seems to suggest that at Harvard it might be Presbyterianism); a religiosity committed in theory, and hence probably in the long run in practice, to coercion and to a monolithic educational system like that of Communism; a religiosity associated with the "Big Answer," and "the flashy existentialist or teutonic theologian." The only other possibility Mr. Bartley seems to envisage is a continuation of the sort of analytical, positivistic, linguistic philosophy which dominates the philosophy departments of a surprising number of our best universities, a philosophy which scorns the "Big Answer" to devote itself to debunking the "Big Question." As Mr. Bartley says, analytical philosophers go on "analyzing endlessly until they know in detail what is wrong with other answers even though they find no exciting solutions of their own." The odd thing is that he apparently regards this statement as high praise. Bartley grants that, to the uninitiated, such philosophers may seem "dry," a verbal desert, a wasteland. But it is plain where his own sympathies lie. To him, analytic philosophers are "those few sober men" who have the "Courage to Think."

But surely these are not the only alternatives. Indeed, if I can judge from the best of my students at Northwestern, the future belongs to neither of them. I cannot see among these students anything remotely resembling a revival of orthodox, sectarian religion. I have no doubt that many of my very keenest, most sensitive, and imaginative students regularly attend churches. And I know that quite a lot of them go on after graduation to seminaries. But I know also that they are people of sane tolerance and good judgment; they take the orthodox, sectarian doctrine with the same considerable mental reservations as are no doubt made also by a goodly number of the pastors who dutifully repeat the old formulae. A Billy Graham crusade at Northwestern would surely find our responsible students where they ought to be: in their rooms, studying.

Nor does the majority of my most creative students find analytic philosophy the inspiring thing it was thirty or forty years ago. There are a few, indeed, who are still attracted to the quick-and-easy orthodoxy of the Big Debunk and the Belittling Answer. And there are a few

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who are committed to analytic philosophy for the honest reason that it seems to them to be true. But increasingly, I find, my students are very much concerned with ultimate questions and with values.

QUITE DEFINITELY it is the Big Question and the Big Answer which are again exciting large numbers of able students. But not the Big Answer of Presbyterianism or of any other traditional Christian sect. Nor is it the Big Answer which is accepted merely out of *Time's* "urgent desire to believe" or out of "irrationalism and double-talk." What is again exciting are the Big Answers of the traditional philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Spinoza, Hume, Hegel, Neitzsche. And the Big Answers of the great phenomenologists and existentialists of Europe: Husserl, Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre, Jaspers, Buber. Surely these are philosophers who inquire into the Big Questions with at least as much insight and rigor as the analytic philosophers bring to the Exceedingly Small Answer.

Are these new philosophers "religious"? Certainly they do not discard religion as a linguistic confusion. In that sense they are more sympathetic to religion than some analytic philosophers. They take religion seriously. But by no stretch of the imagination can they be classified as sectarians or accused of religiosity. Some of them work within a single religious tradition. Some of them are agnostics. And some are outright atheists.

But what of the question of principle which was posed in the lead to Mr. Bartley's article: "To what value, if any, should a free university be committed in a world split by rival doctrines?" Granted that there are a number of more promising substantive philosophies than religious sectarianism, has a free university the right to commit itself, as an institution, to any of them?

A university exists to seek the greatest possible enlightenment of human experience. An immediate corollary of this is the negative one that a university cannot forbid or restrain the free expression of any idea or valuation which does illumine human experience. A second implication is that a university must exert itself positively to assure that, so far as its means permit, all points of view which shed light on human experience shall be vigorously represented in the forum. With this understanding of the purpose of a university, let me try to answer a series of questions which, taken together, add up to the general question of what attitude a university may properly adopt toward substantive commitments.

1) ***May a teacher be personally committed to the point of view he teaches?*** Yes, of course he may. ***Can a point of view be effectively taught by a teacher who is not personally committed to it?*** Yes, of course it can—provided the teacher is able to take a reasonably sympathetic attitude toward it. Any decent teacher can, and does everyday, make living and vital any number of points of view to which he is not personally committed, although it goes without saying that we all have limits to what we can appreciate and understand "from the inside out." No general rule can be laid down about the committed versus the uncommitted teacher.

2) ***Can a university use coercion to maintain a substantive commitment?*** The answer to this is "no." A university's facilities, and its rewards, must be equally open to all who can contribute to, or profit from, enlightenment. It cannot rightfully require any particular commitment which would operate so as to exclude from its society those who do not share this commitment. This holds for religious commitments, but it holds also in a number of areas in the case of which, I regret to say, coercion is generally practiced and accepted as normal. A university ought not to require physical exercise of its students, for this contributes nothing to enlightenment. For the same reason it ought not to place moral restrictions upon its students, as most universities do when, for example, they require female students to observe "late hours." I suppose it ought not even to set health standards beyond those required by the community at large.

3) ***Can a university avail itself of its "captive audience" to propagate a substantive commitment?*** Again I should say "no." Prayers and flags at Commencement exercises may operate to exclude persons who do not share these commitments. They are therefore inconsistent with a university's purpose. That prayers are said in Congress and that coins carry "In God We Trust" do not prove these things right. They prove only that we are not fully free.

4) ***Can a university "unify the curriculum" about a substantive commitment?*** Most definitely not. The only relevant criterion of a good curriculum is whether it enlightens human experience. It is beside the point whether it also makes religious people, or healthy people, or happy people.

5) ***Can a university maintain a divinity school committed to one particular creed?*** In principle, yes. In the case of theology, it is difficult, to be sure, to see the advantages of employing a second-rate Presbyterian instead of a first-rate Jew. Religion seems to be an area in which any really good man, whatever his sectarian commitments or lack of them, can provide more illumination than a pretty good man who happens to share the official belief of the school. But I suppose exceptions could arise. The principle, however, is clear: even in the case of divinity schools, if they are part of a university, the criterion to be applied in staffing the school is how the school may most effectively fulfill the end for which a university exists, enlightenment, not what particular substantive faith its members subscribe to.

6) ***May the president of a university***

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support a particular substantive commitment, make speeches in its favor, and use his personal prestige to further its cause? Yes, certainly he may. President Pusey of Harvard has the same right to speak his mind on religious matters, or on any matter whatever, that I have to speak my mind in this letter. Students and faculty may disagree with what he says, but certainly not with his right to say it.

7) *May a university, as an institution, endorse a particular substantive commitment?* Yes. Provided, that such endorsement proceeds from those who compose the corporate body which a university is. Obviously, no institution can be committed by the unauthorized act of an administrative officer, even if that officer happens to be the president or the chairman of the board.

8) *May a university support financially, either directly or by permitting use of its property, a church which represents a specific substantive commitment?* Here I think the answer is both "yes" and "no," but mostly "yes." If a university were *only* an educational institution, which is what it *chiefly* is, then the answer would be "no." In that case, all of a university's resources should be devoted to the end of enlightenment and none of them frittered away on irrelevant concerns. To be sure, a university would have a positive obligation to maintain, or at least to assure access to, a church. For actually participating in, or at least attending, a church service is itself enlightening, just as being in plays, or attending them, is enlightening over and beyond what can be learned from a lecture on the subject. But a church which existed solely for enlightenment would certainly be a non-sectarian church in which a variety of religious services take place.

But in fact a university is not just an educational institution. It is also a community of people who work together and to some extent live and play together. It builds parking lots, participates in Blue Cross plans, runs employment offices, and permits the latest folk-singer the use of its auditorium. I cannot see why it should not, in the same way, provide a church, or churches, without undertaking to provide every sort of a church, or a church which was no church in particular. Personally, I am very glad Harvard changed its mind about Jewish marriages in Memorial Church. If Mr. Bartley's article had anything to do with this change of policy, I am grateful to him. For the new policy accords with *my* substantive commitments. But I think Harvard has every right to maintain a sectarian church if it wants to. And that doing so is no more incompatible with its mission as a free university than is the fact that it supports a student health service.

But suppose some institution which called itself a "university" or a "college" did not really espouse this goal at all, but some other, say the propagation of Roman Catholicism? At this point we reach a matter of ultimate values where "proof" is impossible. One simply makes—or, better, discovers—one's commitment. Either one is committed to education. Or one is committed to something else (like "education, but . . ."). It is a matter of what one "really believes in." This, however, can be said. A university which is not dedicated to the ideal of free education will pretty quickly end up with a lot of dead wood where its faculty ought to be. For teachers, most of us, do believe in enlightenment. That is our commitment.

BY FAR the most frightening statement in Mr. Bartley's article is that the issue of religion in education is something which, at Harvard, "faculty members will discuss 'off the cuff' but not for publication. . . ." I do not know whether this statement is true—whether the administration of Harvard has, under President Pusey, become so intolerant, and the faculty so pusillanimous, that professors are now afraid to say openly what they say in private. It seems strange that, if it is true, I have not heard of it from my personal friends on the Harvard faculty. On the other hand, Mr. Bartley is on the scene, as I am not, and should know whereof he speaks. But this I do know: *if* it is true that the Harvard faculty is, under President Pusey, afraid to speak out, then Harvard, which has been a great university for more than three centuries, will within 30 years be a tenth-rate diploma mill.

ASHER MOORE

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THE ONLY WAR WORTH WINNING

DR. THOMAS A. DOOLEY, a thirty-one year old physician from St. Louis, is a front-lines soldier in mankind's greatest war — the war against human suffering. Since 1955 Dr. Dooley has worked with dedication to bring his medical skills to tens of thousands of Southeast Asian peoples. Many had never seen a doctor. In 1955-56, as a Navy doctor, Tom Dooley treated thousands of Vietnamese refugees who fled from the Communist North to Free South Vietnam. Dr. Dooley returned to Laos in late 1956 as a civilian representative of the International Rescue Committee, to build new medical clinics and to practice medicine in the jungle only a few miles from the Chinese border.

As a result of his experiences, Dr. Dooley returned to the United States in early 1958 determined to help organize a systematic onslaught against the greatest single scourge to the human race—disease. In cooperation with the IRC, he helped to found MEDICO.

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